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NOTES
HOW WIDE SHOULD THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE GATEWAY
BE? AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY THE MISCARRIAGE OF
JUSTICE EXCEPTION FOR FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PROCEEDINGS
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him
free."'
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INTRODUCTION
Despite its numerous constitutional and statutory safeguards, the
criminal justice system in America is far from perfect. Juries
unfortunately convict individuals of crimes they did not commit.
Take, for instance, the story of Beverly Monroe. Monroe's freedom
was taken away on November 2, 1992, when a jury found her guilty
of murdering her long-time boyfriend.2 On March 5, 1992, Monroe
discovered her boyfriend dead with a gun in his hand.' The prosecu-
tion immediately focused on Monroe, despite the lack of forensic
evidence connecting her to the murder and the fact that she had a
legitimate alibi.4 Monroe served nearly seven years of her sentence
before a district judge granted her freedom in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding, finding that the prosecution had suppressed
material, exculpatory evidence.5 On March 26, 2003, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the grant of habeas relief.6
Monroe's case is an exceptional one, and cases such as hers are
becoming fewer and farther between, especially with relatively
recent technological advances in forensic evidence, such as DNA
testing.7 The possibility for wrongful conviction, however, is never-
theless present in America, and the courts of this country take
this risk seriously.' Due to this ever-present risk, postconviction
2. Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2003). Convicted of first-degree
murder, Monroe was sentenced to a total of twenty-two years in prison. Id.
3. Ralph Blumenthal, A Virginia Tale of Love and Death, Suspicions and Doubt, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at A12.
4. Id.
5. Monroe, 323 F.3d at 290-91; Tom Campbell, Monroe 'Good at Smiling Now" Enjoying
Freedom During Appeal, RIcHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 7, 2002, at B1.
6. Monroe, 323 F.3d at 290-91.
7. See, e.g., Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglarticle.php?scid=6&did=412#inn-yr-rc (last visited Oct. 9,
2008). The number of exonerations in 2003 was at an all-time high at twelve, but in the last
four years, the combined total was only twelve exonerations (six in 2004, two in 2005, one in
2006, and three in 2007). Id.
8. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting the maxim "that it is better
that ninety-nine ... offenders should escape, than that one innocent man should be
condemned" (quoting THOMAS STARKIE, EVIDENCE 756 (1824))); Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29,
39 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., concurring) ("We usually say that it is better that some
number of guilty persons go free than that one innocent person be imprisoned, though we
might not all agree on the number of wrongful acquittals we are willing to accept to guard
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procedures are elaborate and attempt "to ensure not only that a
trial was fair, but also that no individual has been wrongly con-
victed."9 This Note addresses a very specific procedure for relief on
the ladder of postconviction safeguards: the actual innocence
gateway, an exception to the doctrine that a procedurally barred
petitioner may not petition for federal habeas relief without a
showing of cause and prejudice. ° The Monroe court did not base its
decision on this exception because of the success of Monroe's Brady
claim," but a failure to satisfy a procedural requirement below may
have likely led Monroe's counsel to attempt to utilize the actual
innocence exception before a federal habeas court. Though cases like
Monroe's are relatively uncommon, it is nonetheless important for
petitioners to understand the processes and procedures along the
postconviction pathway as they make their arguments for habeas
relief.
Habeas corpus is the primary method for state prisoners to
challenge the legality of their convictions in federal court,'2 and
various policies, values, and considerations come into play during
a federal habeas proceeding.' 3 Among these considerations is the
underlying notion that "habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable
remedy."'4 But this remedy can also be a powerful tool for individu-
als convicted of crimes to challenge the decision handed down by a
jury of their peers and affirmed by numerous courts on appeal. 15
against one wrongful conviction.").
9. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 299 (4th Cir. 2002).
10. Courts refer to this claim as both the actual innocence gateway and the miscarriage
of justice exception. See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006); Schiup, 513 U.S. at 524
(holding that a "procedurally defaulted petitioner" is required to demonstrate "that a consti-
tutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent" in
order to be granted habeas relief).
11. Monroe, 323 F.3d at 316-17 (concluding that "it is impossible to say that Beverly
Monroe received a fair trial, or that we should be confident she is guilty of first-degree
murder"). A prosecutor violates his Brady obligation when he fails "to disclose any material
favorable to an accused even if it could not have been introduced as independent evidence of
innocence." Id. at 291 n.3. In order to be granted relief under a Brady claim, the habeas
petitioner must demonstrate that the suppression of evidence affected the trial's outcome. Id.
12. CARY FEDERMAN, THE BODY AND THE STATE: HABEAS CORPUS AND AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2006).
13. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 319-25.
14. Id. at 319.
15. FEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 18 ("[Habeas corpus] gives the dangerous classes more
than a voice; it gives them a weapon to attack a jury's psychological determination of guilt and
672 [Vol. 50:669
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After conviction, habeas petitioners do not enjoy a presumption
of innocence, as they are no longer merely individuals accused of a
crime. 6 To the contrary, having been found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, the habeas petitioner faces the court with a
strong presumption of guilt. 7
Federal courts allow state prisoners to bypass procedural bars
and petition for federal habeas relief when they have claims
based on their actual innocence. 8 The Supreme Court articulated
the evidentiary standard for claims of actual innocence in habeas
petitions in Schiup v. Delo.'9 Habeas petitioners must "support
[their] allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence
-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-
witness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not
presented at trial."2 Since the Schlup decision, lower courts have
wrestled with interpretations of the seemingly simple adjective
"new." In fact, these interpretations have produced a split among
the circuits on the issue of "whether Schiup requires 'newly discov-
ered' evidence or merely 'newly presented' evidence."'"
This Note posits that the actual innocence standard for present-
ing new evidence to a habeas court should be further narrowed to
exclude "newly presented" evidence. The gateway to the petitioner's
constitutional habeas claims should be limited by a prerequisite
that the petitioner present "newly discovered" evidence to support
a claim of actual innocence. Part I of this Note discusses relevant
background information on the writ of habeas corpus, including the
specific requirements imposed on habeas petitioners by federal
legislation. Part II addresses the current state of the law regarding
the actual innocence exception in federal habeas corpus cases. Part
III compares the "newly discovered" standard with the "newly
presented" standard based on case law and policy concerns sur-
rounding habeas corpus relief. Part IV briefly examines three states'
dangerousness. It gives the condemned a language to rebut the charges, convictions,
misrepresentations in the same terms that were used against them.").
16. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326 n.42; Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 317 (4th Cir. 2002).
17. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326 n.42.
18. See, e.g., id. at 324.
19. Id.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Wright v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 581, 591 (5th Cir. 2006).
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approaches to dealing with the issue for additional guidance re-
garding which standard of evidence should govern. Finally, Part V
concludes that United States courts should adopt the uniform
approach that new evidence in an actual innocence habeas claim
must be "newly discovered" evidence.
I. HABEAS CORPUS GENERALLY
A. Historical Context
The Constitution provides that "the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."22 Since
ratification of the Constitution, the writ has evolved into the
procedure by which courts examine the constitutionality of the
petitioner's incarceration.23 "[T]he writ of habeas corpus [now]
extends to anyone 'in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States."'24 A habeas court does not consider
the facts of the petitioner's case or weigh evidence to determine his
guilt or innocence.25 The court's jurisdiction is restricted to constitu-
tional issues surrounding the petitioner's detention, thus the federal
judge "need only address whether the custodian has the authority
to deprive the petitioner of his constitutionally-protected liberty."26
In other words, a federal habeas petition, one of the final stages in
a petitioner's appeal for relief, is an attack upon the legality of the
petitioner's confinement.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
23. ERic M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CoRpus: RETHINIUNG THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 1
(2001).
24. J. Brent Alldredge, Federal Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Claims of Actual
Innocence Based on DNA Evidence, 56 SMU L. REV. 1005, 1008 (2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (200[0])).
25. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 390-91 (1993).
26. Id.
27. FREEDMAN, supra note 23, at 1.
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B. The Requirements of the AEDPA and the Resulting Effect on
Petitions for Federal Habeas Corpus
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) now governs federal habeas corpus proceedings.2" In
addition to requiring habeas petitioners to exhaust their state law
remedies,29 the AEDPA imposed four major changes regarding
habeas proceedings, including a one-year time limit for filing habeas
petitions.3 ° Furthermore, petitioners now have a single opportunity
for federal habeas review, except in extraordinary circumstances.31
Though the constitutional right to counsel does not apply at the
habeas level, 2 the AEDPA established an "opt-in" provision to allow
states to decide whether to provide a petitioner with counsel in
habeas proceedings.3 Finally, "a determination of a factual issue
made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant
shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness
by clear and convincing evidence.3 4 With these procedural require-
ments, the AEDPA has greatly inhibited the federal courts' ability
to grant relief to state prisoners beyond their first habeas petition.38
"[T]he AEDPA does not leave a lot of room for state prisoners to
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). See generally FEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 157. President Bill
Clinton signed this bill into law just one year and five days after the Oklahoma City bombing.
Id. Even though the primary concern behind the bill's passage was the possibility that
terrorists would be set free on technicalities, "rather than on the substance of guilt or
innocence," Congress also addressed procedural concerns based on a report by a committee
appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 158-59.
29. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) ("[Tihe state prisoner must give the
state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal
court in a habeas petition.!).
30. FEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 160.
31. Id.
32. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that neither the
Eighth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause guarantee an indigent petitioner the right
to counsel in postconviction proceedings).
33. FEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 160. By opting-in and providing counsel, a state can
reduce the amount of time that a prisoner has to file for federal review. Id. If the state fails
to opt-in, the habeas filing deadline is then doubled from 180 days to 360. Id.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000).
35. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001). For instance, "[i]f the prisoner asserts a claim
that he has already presented in a previous federal habeas petition, the claim must be
dismissed in all cases." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2000)).
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make their case for unlawful confinement."36 The rigidity of the
habeas requirements and possibility that a petitioner may be
procedurally barred present a need for clarity in the standards to
petition and receive a writ of habeas corpus from federal court.
C. Additional Reasons To Clarify the Standard for Relief Based on
a Claim of Actual Innocence
In addition to the rigorous procedural standards required to file
a petition for a writ, two other concerns warrant a resolution of
the evidentiary standard required for a petitioner to fall within
the actual innocence exception. A substantial number of habeas
petitions come from inmates on death row, and the Supreme Court
in Schlup acknowledged that the "quintessential miscarriage of
justice is the execution of a person who is entirely innocent."37
Unfortunately, these capital defendants are often indigent and
frequently receive fewer due process protections than the average
defendant.38 Therefore, "the existence of a meaningful [and clear]
federal habeas corpus remedy for state prisoners is especially
important in death penalty cases."39 Also troublesome is the fact
that the decision whether to grant habeas relief typically rests in
the hands of one judge.4 ° One scholar aptly captured the essence of
this concern:
In principle ... the writ of habeas corpus allows a solitary federal
judge-so many miles removed from the crime scene, and
perhaps some ten years after the initial conviction was rendered,
after memories have faded and witnesses have either moved
away or died-to find a due process violation sufficient enough
36. FEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 161.
37. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-35 (1995).
38. See FREEDMAN, supra note 23, at 147. These defendants are more likely than noncap-
ital defendants to face problems such as "distortions arising from racism, the incompetence
of defense counsel, their own mental limitations, public passion, political pressures, or jury
prejudice or confusion." Id.; see also ERIC M. FREEDMAN, Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital
Cases, in AMERIcA's EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST,
PREsENTAND FUTURE OFTHE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION409, 424-25 (James Acker et al. eds.,
1998).
39. FEDERMAN, supra note 12, at 6-7.
40. Id.
676 [Vol. 50:669
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to overturn the judgment of numerous state judges and twelve
jurors.41
The rigid procedural requirements imposed by the AEDPA for
habeas petitions, coupled with the fact that prisoners' lives and
freedom are potentially left up to the discretion of a single judge,
demonstrate the need for precise requirements for actual innocence
claims. All efforts should be made to ensure that this standard is as
clear as possible. The current circuit split regarding the meaning of
"new" evidence reveals that there is room for clarification of the
requirements for petitioners' habeas claims based on the miscar-
riage of justice exception."
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW ON THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION
TODAY
Generally, procedural bars preclude federal review of a habeas
claim that state courts would consider defaulted unless the peti-
tioner can show cause and prejudice.43 The petitioner must give a
reason for failing to challenge the alleged constitutional violation
and demonstrate actual prejudice as a result.44
A. The Gateway: An Exception to Showing Cause and Prejudice
Actual innocence claims are an exception to the requirement of
showing cause and prejudice.45 Notably, actual innocence is not
the same as legal innocence.46 Legal innocence occurs when the
prosecution fails to introduce sufficient proof at trial to demonstrate
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas actual
innocence simply means that the defendant did not actually commit
41. Id.
42. See infra Part II.C.
43. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87
(1977); Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 338 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Mark M. Oh, Note, The
Gateway for Successive Habeas Petitions: An Argument for Schlup v. Delo's Probability
Standard for Actual Innocence Claims, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 2341 (1998).
44. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976).
45. Hubbard, 378 F.3d at 338.
46. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538,559 (1998) (noting that the miscarriage ofjustice
exception deals with petitioners claiming actual, rather than legal, innocence).
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the alleged crime.47 Courts reason that the actual innocence
exception strikes a necessary balance between the "societal interest
in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources with
the individual interest in justice."48 Courts examine petitions based
on claims of actual innocence if a "miscarriage of justice" would
occur absent review.49
This particular exception is not a constitutional one, but rather
a "gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his
otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits."50
For example, a petitioner with an underlying claim for relief based
on ineffective assistance of counsel at trial who fails to meet a
deadline or is procedurally barred for another reason generally will
not be able to argue his underlying claim to a federal habeas court.
If he meets the requirements of the actual innocence exception,
however, the gate will open for him to argue the ineffective assis-
tance claim. This was precisely the situation in Schiup in which the
Supreme Court, having concluded that Schlup met the requirements
for an actual innocence claim, remanded his case to allow him to
argue his underlying constitutional claims.51
B. The Schlup Decision
The Schiup Court held that a procedurally defaulted habeas
petitioner must show that "a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent" in order
to proceed on a claim of actual innocence." In order for this claim to
be credible, the petitioner must present new, reliable evidence to
support his contention of innocence.5" Relying on the Schiup
47. Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v.
Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 122 (2005).
48. Tania Nelson, House v. Bell A Second Chance for Procedurally Barred Claims, 8 LOY.
J. PuB. INT. L. 225, 225 (2007).
49. Hubbard, 378 F.3d at 338; Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 412 (3d Cir. 2002) ("To
show a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must demonstrate that he is actually
innocent of the crime ... by presenting new evidence of innocence.").
50. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (holding that a claim of actual innocence,
without an underlying constitutional claim, will not independently warrant federal habeas
relief).
51. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 332 (1995).
52. Id. at 321.
53. Id. at 324.
678 [Vol. 50:669
2008] HOW WIDE SHOULD THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE GATEWAY BE 679
decision, several circuit court decisions have discussed the standard
to be applied when faced with habeas claims of actual innocence
based on "new" evidence.54
C. The Resulting Split Among the Circuits
In Wright v. Quarterman, the Fifth Circuit identified the split
among the courts of appeals as to whether the Schlup standard
"requires 'newly discovered' evidence or merely 'newly presented'
evidence."55 The Eighth Circuit's position is that the new evidence
claimed by the petitioner must not have been available at trial and
"could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due
diligence."56 The petitioner in Osborne v. Purkett, convicted of rape,
claimed that he should be allowed to bypass the procedural bar to
argue his constitutional claim before the court.57 To support his
claim, he presented the court with an affidavit containing testimony
that another individual had a sexual relationship with the victim,
a fact that provided a potentially exculpatory explanation for the
conclusion of the forensic examination-that she had engaged in
sexual intercourse before her death.5" The court concluded that the
affidavit did not constitute new evidence because the evidence
existed at the time of the trial and could easily have been discovered
through due diligence.59 Although the petitioner's new evidence
likely would have met the "newly presented" evidence standard, the
court refused to consider his evidence based on its interpretation
that the standard should be narrow and include only newly
discovered evidence.6 °
The Third Circuit subscribes to the same interpretation of Schlup.
In Hubbard v. Pinchak, the petitioner, convicted in state court of
54. See infra Part II.C.
55. 470 F.3d 581, 591 (5th Cir. 2006) (declining to address the circuit split because the
petitioner had not demonstrated that reasonable jurors would find the merits of his Brady
claims debatable).
56. Osborne v. Purkett, 411 F.3d 911,920 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Amrine v. Bowersox, 238
F.3d 1023, 1029 (8th Cir. 2001)).
57. Id. at 916.
58. Id. The prosecution presented evidence of the victim's Sexual Abuse Forensic
Examination, which was consistent with the victim having had sexual intercourse. Id. at 914.
59. Id. at 920.
60. Id.
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felony murder and robbery, appealed the district court's denial of
habeas relief to the Third Circuit.61 The petitioner based his actual
innocence claim on his own sworn testimony, which had not been
presented to the jury. The court did not accept his argument,
concluding that a "defendant's own late-proffered testimony is not
'new' because it was available at trial."63 According to the Third
Circuit, a petitioner's decision to withhold the testimony from the
jury does not give him the ability to present it to a habeas court
under the actual innocence exception.64
In contrast, in Gomez v. Jaimet, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that Schiup only required the petitioner to present new evidence
that was reliable and had not been presented during trial in order
to make an actual innocence claim.66 The petitioner filed a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court after the Illinois Appellate Court
affirmed his murder conviction.66 The petitioner in Gomez supported
his claim with statements from his codefendants and his own
testimony.67 Disregarding the state's argument that the evidence
was not new because it was not "newly discovered," the court stated
that "if a petitioner comes forth with evidence that was genuinely
not presented to the trier of fact then no bar exists to the habeas
court evaluating whether the evidence is strong enough to establish
petitioner's actual innocence."6 The court's holding effectively
adopted the "newly presented" standard of evidence for claims of
actual innocence.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit construed the Schiup standard for
evidence as merely "newly presented" evidence.69 After being in-
dicted for murder, Griffin obtained psychiatric records to support an
insanity defense." Defense counsel, however, ignored information
61. 378 F.3d 333, 336-37 (3d Cir. 2004).
62. Id. at 340.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 350 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2003).
66. Id. at 677.
67. Id. at 679.
68. Id. at 680. Despite this favorable ruling, the court ultimately held that the petitioner
failed to meet the stringent standard. The court was not convinced "that it [was] more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the statements of his
co-defendants and his own testimony." Id.
69. Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2003).
70. Id. at 959.
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indicating that the defendant suffered from Non-Psychotic Organic
Brain Syndrome and chose not to use insanity as a defense, contrary
to the petitioner's wishes.71 Arguing that it was not entered
voluntarily and intelligently, the petitioner appealed his guilty plea,
but failed to present the medical records to the postconviction
court.72 When the state courts denied relief, the defendant peti-
tioned for federal habeas corpus relief.73 The habeas court faced the
question of whether hospital and prison medical records satisfied
the "new reliable evidence" standard from Schlup. 4 Although the
records at issue had been available during the plea negotiations,
they had not been offered into evidence during those negotiations. 5
The court decided to interpret Schlup's language broadly to include
any evidence not introduced at trial. 76 Even though the court con-
sidered the medical records to be "new," evidence, the petitioner was
not successful because he was unable to demonstrate that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him if the evidence had been
presented at trial.77
D. The Supreme Court's Failure To Clarify
The most recent case involving a petitioner's claim of actual
innocence in the Supreme Court was in 2006.78 In House v. Bell, a
jury in state court convicted the petitioner of murder and sentenced
him to death.79 Petitioner House filed a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court to pursue constitutional claims that were procedurally
barred under state law.' The Supreme Court did not have the
opportunity to address the circuit split regarding the interpretation
of Schlup's "new evidence" language, because the State stipulated
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. A guilty plea is essentially the equivalent of a conviction for purposes of making
a claim based on actual innocence. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998).
74. Griffin, 350 F.3d at 961.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 962. The court relied on two of its prior decisions when making this deter-
mination. Id.
77. Id. at 965.
78. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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that the petitioner was presenting new reliable evidence in the
habeas proceeding."'
The Court reiterated that the Schlup standard, rather than the
more stringent standard for federal habeas review contained in the
AEDPA, applied to petitions seeking relief based on a claim of
actual innocence." The Court concluded that its review of the
petitioner's case would be based on a consideration of '"all the
evidence,' old and new, incriminating and exculpatory." In
addition, the Court said that a habeas court can review evidence
regardless of whether it would be admissible at trial, but did not
suggest whether "newly discovered" or "newly presented" was the
appropriate evidentiary standard for a claim of actual innocence.'
Therefore, the circuit split remains unresolved.
III. THE "NEWLY DISCOVERED" VERSUS "NEWLY PRESENTED"
STANDARDS
Without controlling precedent from the Supreme Court regard-
ing whether the Schiup standard requires "newly discovered" or
simply "newly presented" evidence, lower courts are free to choose
between the two methods for determining what constitutes "new"
evidence in habeas claims based on the actual innocence excep-
tion. Requiring only "newly presented" evidence gives a habeas
petitioner more latitude when submitting evidence to the court. In
contrast, the "newly discovered" standard has the additional
requirement of unavailability at the time of trial.8" A comparison of
the two standards by considering the precedent in this area, as well
as the many policy concerns surrounding the writ of habeas corpus,
indicates that the appropriate standard for evidence is the stricter
"newly discovered" standard.
81. Id. at 2077.
82. Id. at 2078; see also Nelson, supra note 48, at 236-37. The standard found in the
AEDPA applies to successive petitions based on claims that were not fully developed in the
lower courts, rather than procedurally barred claims based on actual innocence and supported
with new evidence. House, 547 U.S. at 539.
83. House, 547 U.S. at 538 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995)).
84. Id.
85. See generally Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2004); Gomez v. Jaimet, 350
F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2003).
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A. Suggestions from Prior Decisions
The case law surrounding the actual innocence exception for
procedurally barred habeas petitioners provides several hints as to
which standard of evidence the Schiup Court intended to imple-
ment.
1. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion in Schlup
In Schiup, Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion conclud-
ing that the majority's holding required "newly discovered" evidence
rather than only "newly presented."' The 5-4 decision made
O'Connor's vote a critical one.87 O'Connor began her opinion by
saying that she intended to explain what she believed the Court's
holding meant.' According to her, the Court held that a habeas
petitioner must present "newly discovered evidence of innocence"
in order to meet the actual innocence exception requirements.8 9
Her clarification of the standard requires petitioners to present
evidence that had not been previously available to the defendant.9 °
O'Connor's concurrence is significant for two reasons. First,
concurring opinions, especially in cases with a divided court, offer
commentary on the majority decisions, and may potentially provide
assistance to lower courts attempting to follow the decision.9
Throughout her tenure on the Court, O'Connor wrote a number of
concurring, as well as dissenting, opinions which eventually became
86. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 332-33 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 962 (9th Cir. 2003).
88. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332.
89. Id. at 332-33.
90. See id.
91. See NANCY MAVEETY, JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE SUPREME
COURT 55 (1996); Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence
by the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 777, 783 (1990); Igor Kirman, Note, Standing
Apart To Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2084 (1995). But see County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
492 U.S. 573,668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
a concurring opinion does not "take precedence over an opinion joined in its entirety by five
Members of the Court" and that the majority went too far in referring to a concurrence in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), as the Court's opinion).
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the majority position of the Court. 2 Furthermore, other Supreme
Court cases have been decided by one justice when the Court was
split.9 3 In that respect, O'Connor's opinion in SchIup may be seen as
"both an agent of stare decisis and an agent of change."9 4 Lower
courts should give her opinion a great deal of weight when interpret-
ing the Schlup standard.
Second, Justice O'Connor was frequently an influential "swing"
vote on the Court.95 This position arguably gave her the ability "to
exercise considerable power" over the Court's rulings.96 Her influ-
ence over her colleagues on close cases, such as Schiup, lends
support to the conclusion that her concurring opinion in that case
should be viewed as the law with respect to new evidence for a
habeas petition in federal court. If nothing else, her opinion may be
seen as guidance for lower courts-guidance that the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits failed to observe.
92. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (embracing O'Connor's
formulation of the "undue burden test"). O'Connor first suggested the "undue burden test" in
a dissenting opinion in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and later employed the test in her concurring opinion in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (urging the Court to adopt a new
test with respect to Establishment Clause cases). Her proposed "endorsement test" has been
cited with approval by the Court in subsequent First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Witters v.
Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
55-56 (1985). For further discussion on the influence of O'Connor's opinions in the areas of
religion, reproductive rights and burdens, and racial communities and communities of
interest, see MAVEETY, supra note 91, at 75-87, 91-104, 107-21.
93. Most notably, in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the
Court's ruling turned on the decision of Justice Powell, even though no other justice agreed
with his analysis regarding affirmative action in state medical school admissions.
94. Ray, supra note 91, at 783 (noting that concurring opinions "may propose future
avenues for development of the law laid down by the majority").
95. See MAVEETY, supra note 91, at 28; Diane Lowenthal & Barbara Palmer, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor: The World's Most Powerful Jurist?, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 211, 238 (2004); Carl R. Schenker, Jr., 'Reading' Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 487, 490 (1982). One commentator noted, "In her 22 years on
the nation's highest court, Justice O'Connor has firmly established herself as the single most
important voice on a nine-member tribunal that decides some of America's most difficult and
politically contentious issues ...." Warren Richey, As O'Connor Votes, So Tilts the Supreme
Court, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 30, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
2003/0630/p0ls02-usju.html.
96. Lowenthal & Palmer, supra note 95, at 238 ("She may not [have been] at the exact
ideological center of the Court, but she [was] close enough to play a key role, particularly on
cases with fragile coalitions, and the bottom line is that most of the time, most of the other
Justices agree[d] with her.").
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2. Recognition of the Importance of O'Connor's Concurrence in
Griffin v. Johnson
Ironically, the court in Griffin noted O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Schiup, the fact that she cast a crucial vote in the
decision, and that she clearly employed the term "newly discovered,"
rather than "newly presented."97 The Griffin court went further to
say that "[Justice O'Connor's] opinion could constitute Schiup's
holding.""8 The court recognized that in cases where the Supreme
Court is fragmented and did not base its decision on a single
rationale, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the
narrowest grounds."9 Following that reasoning, O'Connor's adop-
tion of the "newly discovered" evidence standard is controlling. Her
inclusion of the "newly discovered" requirement is a narrower
holding than interpretations of the majority opinion that only
call for "newly presented" evidence. Contrary to the recommenda-
tion of the magistrate judge and the guidance provided by
O'Connor's concurring opinion, however, the Griffin court chose to
adopt the "newly presented" standard for evidence based on its own
case law.' In doing so, the court glossed over the distinction and
provided little support for its reasoning.'0 ' Despite its persuasive-
ness, O'Connor's opinion and her adoption of the "newly discovered"
standard have not been cited in any other Supreme Court case since
Schlup.
97. Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 962 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 332 (1995)).
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)); see also Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); Melissa M. Berry, Seeking Clarity in the Federal Habeas Fog:
Determining What Constitutes "Clearly Established" Law Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 810-14 (2005).
100. Griffin, 350 F.3d at 962. The court relied on its 2002 decision that held that "physical
evidence excluded at trial could satisfy Schlup's gateway requirement notwithstanding the
fact that it was not 'newly discovered. Id.; see also Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669 (9th
Cir. 2002).
101. See Griffin, 350 F.3d at 962.
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3. Implications of the Courts'Emphasis on the Strictness of the
Standard
When discussing the requirements to fall within the actual
innocence exception, courts repeatedly refer to the strictness of the
standard. The majority in House v. Bell characterized the Schlup
standard as "demanding" and concluded that it "permits review only
in the 'extraordinary' case."' 2 Other courts have emphasized that
the majority of petitioners who make actual innocence claims are
not victorious.' 3 The Schlup Court also said that new reliable
evidence is "obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases."'0 4
The difficulty in making a successful claim of actual innocence
based on new evidence suggests that the Supreme Court meant
"newly discovered" evidence. "Newly presented" evidence is a much
easier standard for a petitioner to meet than "newly discovered"
evidence. Although both standards require that evidence be reliable,
the latter requires that the evidence was unavailable to the
defendant at the time of trial.0 5 There are a number of reasons that
evidence might not be presented at trial, as opposed to the limited
category of evidence that had been surpressed or not discovered
at the time.106 For instance, a defendant's own testimony, if not
presented at trial, would meet the "newly presented" standard
regardless of the reason for withholding the testimony. The
numerous references by courts to the rigorousness of the Schlup
standard therefore insinuate that the Court was referring to a
standard that requires the new evidence proferred by a habeas
petitioner to be "newly discovered."
102. 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)); see also
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 540 (1998).
103. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 559 ("[lun virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence
has been summarily rejected."); Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting
that this exception applies only in the "extremely rare' and 'extraordinary case' where the
petitioner is actually innocent of the crime for which he is imprisoned" (quoting Schlup, 513
U.S. at 327)); Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1338-39 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting the "very high
barriers" of the Schlup standard); Nelson, supra note 48, at 229-30 (explaining why claims
of actual innocence are rarely successful).
104. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
105. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
106. See Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2003), for an example of a case in
which the prosecution suppressed the evidence.
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4. The Specific Wording Used by the Court in Schlup
Finally, the specific words that the Schlup Court used to define
the standard suggest that new evidence must be "newly discovered."
The Court stated that actual innocence claims must be supported
by "new reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial.'' 7 The
Court's use of both "new" and "not presented at trial" would be
redundant if the Court intended the standard to be merely "newly
presented." The Court simply could have said "evidence that was not
presented at trial" if it had intended for "newly presented" to be the
standard. The Court goes on to approve Judge Friendly's description
of the standard:
The habeas court must make its determination concerning the
petitioner's innocence "in light of all the evidence, including that
alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to
any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have
been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the
trial.' °8
This language indicates that the Court intended "newly discovered"
to be the standard. Notably, Judge Friendly's examples do not
include any that would fall under the category of "newly presented"
evidence and refer only to evidence that has been "newly discov-
ered." By definition, the examples mentioned, which included both
evidence that had been wrongly excluded and evidence that became
available after the trial, are types of evidence that were not
available for the defendant to use during trial. The Court's endorse-
ment of Judge Friendly's characterization of evidence implies that
it intended "newly discovered" evidence to be the measure of
evidence to be considered by a habeas court in an actual innocence
claim.
107. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 328 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 160 (1970)).
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B. Policy Concerns
Though the language used in Schlup, particularly in Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion, suggests that the Court intended to
use the "newly discovered" standard, the lack of explicit grounds in
the case law requires a consideration of the numerous policy
concerns surrounding both standards.
Recently, the volume of habeas petitions in federal courthouses
has increased greatly because of petitioners filing a large number of
frivolous petitions for habeas relief. °9 After the implementation of
the AEDPA, the number of habeas corpus petitions filed by state
prisoners increased significantly." 0 This increase in petitions "has
delayed the administration of justice, prevented the finalization of
verdicts, frustrated federal-state relations, and undermined public
confidence in the criminal justice process.""'
While habeas petitions clearly drain society's resources, four
other considerations further affect the determination of the type of
evidence that a petitioner must present to a habeas court in order
to make a successful actual innocence claim. These issues include
the continuous advancement of technology and its use in the
courtroom, the requirement of defense counsel to use due diligence,
the general concern for finality and comity in criminal cases, and
the basic interest in individual justice.
1. Technology in the Courtroom
Technology, and DNA testing in particular, is an extremely
beneficial law enforcement tool, as well as a useful device in
criminal cases." 2 Scientists continue to make state-of-the-art
109. See Oh, supra note 43, at 2342.
110. JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, SPECIAL REPORT:
PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980-2000 (2002),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/ppfusdOO.txt. From 1995 to 2000, there
were 50 percent more habeas corpus petitions filed by state prison inmates. Id. During 2000,
58,257 petitions were filed in U.S. district courts. Id.
111. Oh, supra note 43, at 2342.
112. Edward K Cheng, Reenvisioning Law Through the DNA Lens, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 649,649 (2005); Matthew J. Mueller, Comment, Handling Claims of Actual Innocence:
Rejecting Federal Habeas Corpus as the Best Avenue for Addressing Claims of Innocence Based
on DNA Evidence, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 250 (2006).
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advances to improve the testing methods used for evidence in the
courtroom.113 DNA testing provides both the government and the
defendant with an accurate method of identifying the origin of
forensic evidence."' Today, defendants have greater access to DNA
testing of physical evidence than ever before, providing them with
the ability to utilize technology to prove their innocence.1 5 As
technology advanced, the legal system necessarily addressed the
admissibility of scientific technologies and methodologies into
evidence." 6 In 2004, Congress passed the Justice for All Act
addressing postconviction DNA testing and preservation of biologi-
cal evidence." 7 As an incentive for states to consider claims of actual
innocence, the law provides that in order for a state to receive
federal funding for DNA testing technologies and research, it must
provide for postconviction DNA testing in various situations."' In
addition, many state legislatures have proposed or enacted legisla-
tion similar to the Justice for All Act." 9
With technology advances and greater access to DNA testing and
other technological discovery tools, the chance that evidence will be
unavailable at the trial level decreases. Because defendants have a
greater opportunity to obtain exculpatory evidence through DNA
testing or other forms of technology, before or during the trial, the
Schiup standard should be restricted to only "newly discovered"
evidence. Technological advances significantly diminish any need
for a "newly presented" standard of evidence. If evidence that would
support a claim of actual innocence has truly been missed and
has resulted in the conviction of an innocent person, the evidence
will surely qualify under the "newly discovered" standard should
the case make it to this level in the postconviction process.
Furthermore, if the overlooked evidence is forensic evidence, then
postconviction DNA testing will likely be conducted based on either
113. Mueller, supra note 112, at 250.
114. Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases
Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389, 391 & nn.1-2 (2002).
115. See Kenneth Williams, Why It Is So Difficult To Prove Innocence in Capital Cases, 42
TULSA L. REv. 241, 243 (2006).
116. Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 114, at 391-92.
117. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 14136 (2000).
119. Mueller, supra note 112, at 256; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1417.9 (West 2008).
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a state or federal postconviction DNA testing statute.12 If exculpa-
tory evidence, whether forensic or otherwise, is available or should
be available at the time of trial, the defense should be required to
present the exculpatory evidence at trial, rather than waiting to use
it during a federal habeas proceeding.
2. Counsel's Obligation To Use Due Diligence
If the petitioner in a habeas proceeding were required only to
support his claim with "newly presented" evidence, then there would
be less of an incentive to discover evidence at the trial level. Under
the broader standard, a defendant could be assured that as long as
the evidence was reliable, he could use it to support his actual
innocence claim to the habeas court, thereby bypassing the state
appellate processes. A "newly discovered" standard would prevent
the defense from "sandbagging" or withholding constitutional claims
in state proceedings in order to have them heard first in federal
court. 2' A more restrictive standard makes certain that the
defendant presents all of his evidence to the trial court, which is the
most appropriate stage for factfinding.
There is a strong argument that a trial court is in a better
position to examine evidence than a judge on habeas review.'22 Chief
Justice Roberts recently noted in House that the trial court has the
ability to "observe[] the witnesses' demeanor, examine[] physical
evidence, and [make] findings" regarding the reliability of the
petitioner's evidence.'23 As time goes by, witnesses may become
unavailable, memories fade, and the risk of perjury increases.'24
Therefore, the best time for a court to review the testimony and
120. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
121. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491-92 (1986) ("Nor do we agree that the possibility
of 'sandbagging' vanishes once a trial has ended in conviction, since appellate counsel might
well conclude that the best strategy is to select a few promising claims for airing on appeal,
while reserving others for federal habeas review should the appeal be unsuccessful.").
122. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 557 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Alldredge, supra note 24, at 1010; Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger
Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2313,2340 (2007).
123. House, 547 U.S. at 557 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief
Justice Roberts did not believe that new evidence should be taken at face value, but that a
trial court should have the opportunity to examine its reliability. Nelson, supra note 48, at
240.
124. Alldredge, supra note 24, at 1010; see also Pettys, supra note 122, at 2340.
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facts of a case is when the evidence is fresh.'25 Because the trial
court is the proper place for review of the evidence, courts should
adopt a standard that provides the greatest incentive for a defen-
dant to present all available evidence at the trial level. The "newly
discovered" standard would provide this incentive because it would
exclude any evidence that was available and known to the defen-
dant or his counsel at the time of trial. Defendants choosing not to
present evidence during trial would run the risk of waiving their
right to present the evidence in the habeas proceeding, and this
danger precludes them from keeping important evidence from the
trial court.
3. The Interest in Finality and Comity
In an earlier case, Justice Powell recognized that there are
"limited circumstances under which the interests of the prisoner in
relitigating constitutional claims held meritless on a prior petition
may outweigh the countervailing interests served by according
finality to the prior judgment."'26 The Court in Schlup cited this
opinion and specifically tied the miscarriage of justice exception to
the petitioner's actual innocence in order to accommodate the
balance of the societal interests of finality and comity with the
interest of justice in these "extraordinary" situations.'27 Justice
Harlan even concluded that both the individual defendant and
society have an interest in the finality of a criminal case. 2 ' He
claimed that the finality of a conviction will provide for a shift in
focus from "whether a conviction was free from error" to "whether
the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community."'2 9
Harlan's opinion also noted the importance of finality in developing
rules governing habeas proceedings. 3 0
125. See Pettys, supra note 122, at 2340 ("[Fjacts are optimally determined when the
evidence is freshest ...." ).
126. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986).
127. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,322 (1995) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496
(1986)).
128. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 25 ("It is with this interest in mind, as well as the desire to avoid confinements
contrary to fundamental justice, that courts and legislatures have developed rules governing
the availability of collateral relief.").
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In addition to the Supreme Court, Congress has also expressed
the value of finality in criminal cases, 3' and both bodies have
developed tough procedural rules, making it more difficult for
petitioners to file successful federal habeas claims.'32 Certainly, the
passage of the AEDPA, with its rigid procedural requirements,
reveals the significance that Congress places on finality in the
criminal justice system.'3 3 If courts choose to adopt the "newly
presented" standard for actual innocence claims, then the habeas
petitions may be endless. The importance of finality would be
severely undermined. The justice system should have a mechanism
in place to prevent petitioners from filing an unlimited number of
unsubstantiated or abusive petitions. 3 1 State prisoners have
nothing to lose, making it more likely that they will file numerous
habeas petitions, regardless of the merits of their claims. 135
Successive claims, particularly meritless ones, impose great costs on
judicial resources.' 6 Considering the paramount importance that
the Court places on finality and conserving resources, it likely did
not intend for petitioners to have endless opportunities to make
claims of actual innocence. 'Without finality, the criminal law is
deprived of much of its deterrent effect" because individuals with
endless opportunities to appeal their convictions are not as likely to
fear the resulting criminal sentence. 37
The judicial system would not be reliable or effective if a criminal
defendant had the ability to challenge incessantly his incarcera-
131. Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 888, 891-92 (1998) (noting that "Congress has chosen to limit the habeas
remedy to cases where the state court decision is clearly wrong, resolving doubtful cases in
favor of the finality of the judgment).
132. Pettys, supra note 122, at 2361.
133. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
134. The Court in Schlup distinguished between successive petitions and abusive ones.
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,318 (1995). Successive petitions raise "grounds identical to those
raised and rejected on the merits on a prior petition."' Id. at 318 n.34 (quoting Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion)). Abusive petitions are "where a
prisoner files a petition raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior
petition, or engages in other conduct that 'disentitle[s] him to the relief he seeks." Id. at 318-
19 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1963)).
135. Oh, supra note 43, at 2343; see also Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 150 (1970) (noting that
state prisoners "have everything to gain and nothing to lose').
136. See Alldredge, supra note 24, at 1010.
137. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989).
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tion."' Procedural rules are a vital and necessary method for
"ensuring that criminal litigation proceeds steadily toward
closure." '139 A "newly discovered" standard allows courts to achieve
finality, while also ensuring that those petitioners who are actually
innocent receive a genuine opportunity for habeas relief.
Comity and federalism go hand in hand with the interest of
finality in criminal cases. 4° States are entitled to finality because
it gives them the ability to enforce their laws.' When state
prisoners petition federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus,
questions of comity inevitably arise. The right to file a habeas
petition repeatedly presents conflicts between federal and state
courts, more so than any other right guaranteed by the American
legal system.'42 This right has been called an anomaly because of
the ability of federal judges to invalidate the decisions of a state
court without giving them preclusive effect. 4" Adopting a narrower
standard for the evidence that petitioners can use to support their
actual innocence claims may alleviate some of the tension that
habeas petitions create. Employing the "newly discovered" standard
for evidence limits federal courts' ability to review state court
decisions because it prohibits petitioners from filing federal habeas
petitions based on the actual innocence exception with nothing more
than "newly presented" evidence supporting their claim.
4. The Ever-Present Interest in Justice
Finality and federalism are important considerations when
determining the standard for evidence on a claim of actual inno-
cence, but the Supreme Court also has recognized the importance of
preventing the execution or long-term incarceration of an innocent
individual.'44 The "newly presented" standard for evidence provides
slightly more insurance that a truly innocent individual will not be
138. Id.
139. Pettys, supra note 122, at 2363.
140. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) ("Finality serves as well to preserve
the federal balance.").
141. Id. at 556.
142. Eric Seinsheimer, Dretke v. Haley and the Still Unknown Limits of the Actual
Innocence Exception, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 905, 907 (2005).
143. Id.
144. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-25 (1995).
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executed or incarcerated. Under the "newly presented" standard,
petitioners would have more opportunities to make claims of actual
innocence. 145 In that case, the "newly presented" standard might be
more apt at protecting individuals who are actually innocent of the
crime for which they have been convicted. Based on a broader
interpretation of the new evidence requirement, a "newly presented"
standard would plausibly allow more claims to pass through "the
Schiup gateway.' 46
Though the "newly presented" standard for evidence is the
broader interpretation of Schlup's holding, the slight advantage that
it gives state prisoners does not outweigh the costs of a wider
gateway. First of all, the majority of petitioners who are actually
innocent will meet the cause and prejudice standard to bypass the
procedural bars. 47 The fear of convicting innocent individuals is
further reduced by the presumption that the state court verdict is
ordinarily correct.14 ' This proposition stems from the constitutional
rights guaranteed to a defendant during trial, as well as the fact
that a jury of peers determines the defendant's guilt. 49 The
requirement that a petitioner must first exhaust his state remedies
ensures that his case will proceed through the trial, the direct
appeal, and state postconviction review before reaching the federal
habeas court.1"' Criminal defendants, therefore, have many
safeguards to ensure that they are not wrongly convicted.' In
addition, habeas corpus relief is not the final opportunity for
incarcerated prisoners and individuals on death row.'52 After the
Supreme Court denied habeas relief to the petitioner in Herrera, for
example, Justice Scalia noted that the petitioner could still file for
executive clemency under Texas law.'53 Scalia further stated,
"[e]xecutive clemency has provided the 'fail safe' in our criminal
justice system.' 54 With executive clemency available as a final
145. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
146. Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003).
147. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 394 (2004).
148. See Alldredge, supra note 24, at 1010.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1009.
151. Id. at 1007.
152. Berg, supra note 47, at 145.
153. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
154. Id.
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safeguard for petitioners, courts need not adopt a standard for new
evidence that would allow potentially endless habeas corpus
petitions.
IV. INSIGHT FROM STATE LAW
Each state allows convicted prisoners some form of relief based on
"newly discovered" evidence.155 Many state legislatures have also
enacted, or at least debated the enactment of, laws addressing the
possibility of postconviction claims of actual innocence. 156 A number
of these states' laws suggests that "newly discovered" evidence is a
better standard than the broader approach of "newly presented"
evidence. 157 For example, when considering these postconviction
laws, both Virginia and Florida legislatures inserted the phrase
"newly discovered" into their respective legislation. 158 Virginia's law
suggests that it would not widen the actual innocence exception to
include "newly presented" evidence.5 9 In 2002, Virginia put to a
referendum the question of whether the state supreme court could
consider actual innocence claims without the requirement that the
claim first be filed in a lower court. 6 ' The amendment stated that
this review would concern only those cases in which an individual
convicted of a felony is able to prove actual innocence through newly
discovered evidence or DNA evidence.' 6 '
Florida has also shown its approval of the "newly discovered"
standard by proposing a bill that would remove any time limit on
petitions based on actual innocence if the new evidence "could not
have been previously discovered by the exercise of due diligence."16 2
Additionally, California allows petitioners to make claims based on
155. Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIz. L. REv. 655,659 (2005). See generally
1 DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK § 1:1-1:9
(2007).
156. Mueller, supra note 112, at 256.
157. Id. at 259 nn.207 & 209.
158. Id. at 259 & n.209.
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (West 2007).
160. Mueller, supra note 112, at 259.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 259 n.209.
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newly discovered evidence, 163 but courts in California limit the
postconviction claims to challenges based on "newly discovered"
evidence that would significantly alter the prosecution's case.'64 The
movement of states to adopt laws that allow for habeas relief on an
actual innocence claim with the introduction of newly discovered
evidence lends support to that standard's superiority over the
"newly presented" standard.
Despite the fact that these three states provide but a small
sample of the manner in which states deal with actual innocence
claims, the plain language of the proposed laws and the treatment
of claims based on actual innocence bolster the argument that
courts should use the "newly discovered" standard for federal
habeas petitions based on the actual innocence exception to
procedurally barred claims.
V. THE SOLUTION: UNIFORM ADOPTION OF THE "NEWLY
DISCOVERED" STANDARD
The Supreme Court cautioned that lower courts should exercise
restraint when dealing with exceptions to the procedural default
doctrine by expanding the exceptions only when necessary." 5 In
dealing with federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, courts should not
allow habeas claims based on the actual innocence exception to
include petitions that are only supported with "newly presented"
evidence. In other words, the actual innocence gateway should not
be expanded to include "newly presented" evidence. Instead, habeas
petitioners should be required to present "newly discovered"
evidence that was not available or could not have been discovered
through due diligence at the time of the trial.
163. Daniel S. Medwed, California Dreaming? The Golden State's Restless Approach to
Newly Discovered Evidence of Innocence, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1437, 1453 & n.81 (2007)
(citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(a) (West 2006)).
164. See, e.g., In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (Cal. 1993). The requirements in California
seem to be narrower than the federal requirements because "the courts have signaled that
newly discovered evidence will not warrant habeas relief unless it thoroughly undermines the
entire structure of the prosecution's case, and such evidence undermines the prosecution's
case only if it is conclusive and 'points unerringly to innocence."' Medwed, supra note 163, at
1454 (quoting In re Weber, 523 P.2d 229, 243 (Cal. 1974)).
165. See Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 338 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Dretke v. Haley, 541
U.S. 386, 388 (2004)).
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Though the case law in this area does not explicitly embrace the
"newly discovered" standard, the language employed by Justice
O'Connor in Schlup strongly suggests that the Court not only
intended the narrower approach, but that lower courts should be
prohibited from allowing actual innocence claims based only on
"newly presented" evidence. Rather than glossing over the distinc-
tion between the two standards, as the Ninth Circuit in Griffin v.
Johnson did, federal courts should require petitioners to present
"newly discovered" evidence. With lives and freedom at stake, there
should be no room for confusion regarding the requirements to
petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.
Moreover, an evaluation of the many policy concerns surrounding
the writ indicates a crucial need for a uniform adoption of a "newly
discovered" standard of evidence among the circuits. In particular,
the narrower standard is the best way to achieve the critical balance
of the "societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of
scarce judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that
arises in the extraordinary case.""16 Courts continually struggle with
maintaining a balance among these concerns, but the imposition of
a "newly discovered" standard will undoubtedly help them to do so.
By the time a petitioner reaches the habeas stage of his
postconviction proceedings, he has been convicted of a crime by a
jury of his peers. Accordingly, the petitioner is no longer entitled to
the presumption of innocence.167 The higher up the postconviction
process, the greater the number of chances the petitioner has had
to demonstrate his innocence. The more chances afforded a peti-
tioner to appeal his sentence, the smaller the risk that he has been
wrongly convicted. In the rare cases like Beverly Monroe's,168 the
judicial system is likely to detect a wrongful conviction before the
need to petition a federal court for review because of the numerous
constitutional and statutory safeguards available in criminal cases.
Moreover, executive clemency, the ultimate safeguard, will always
be a possibility for the truly innocent prisoner.
Conversely, the deeper into the postconviction process, the
greater the need for finality, comity, and conservation of judicial
166. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995).
167. Id. at 326; Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 317 (4th Cir. 2002).
168. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
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resources. As these needs increase, the risk that justice will not be
served decreases. At some point, in order to achieve a balance
between these concerns, the gateway for endless appeals and
petitions must close. For claims of actual innocence, that point can
be clarified by an adoption of the "newly discovered" standard of
evidence. This adoption leaves the gateway open wide enough to
maintain the key balance of all the various interests involved,
including the ability for an actually innocent petitioner to pass
through the gate in order to argue his constitutional claim.
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